Tag Archives: SOX

Get the Message: SEC Enforcement Case Deals With Evaluating ICFR Weaknesses!

By sending a clear message through the enforcement process, the SEC has come full circle in their concerns about whether ICFR audits are finding material weaknesses. The staff has said on numerous occasions that they see too many situations where a company identifies a control deficiency but the company’s analysis fails when assessing whether the control deficiency is in fact a material weakness.

Over the last few years the SEC Staff have emphasized their concerns in numerous speeches and other public settings. As they sometimes do when they don’t see companies listening, they have also emphasized this issue through enforcement.

This enforcement is dramatic, involving:

The company

Two company officers

The audit partner

The ICFR consulting firm partner (a surprise here!)

 

This excerpt from a December 2015 speech by Deputy Chief Accountant Brian Croteau summarizes the SEC’s concerns:

Still, given the frequency with which certain ICFR issues are identified in our consultations with registrants, I’d be remiss not to remind management and auditors of the importance of properly identifying and describing the nature of a control deficiency and understanding the complete population of transactions that a control is intended to address in advance of assessing the severity of any identified deficiencies.  Then, once ready to assess the severity of a deficiency, it’s important to remember that there are two components to the definition of a material weakness – likelihood and magnitude.  The evaluation of whether it is reasonably possible that a material misstatement could occur and not be prevented or detected on a timely basis requires careful analysis that contemplates both known errors, if any, as well as potential misstatements for which it is reasonably possible that the misstatements would not be prevented or detected in light of the control deficiency.  This latter part of the evaluation, also referred to as analysis of the so called “could factor,” often requires management to evaluate information that is incremental to that which would be necessary, for example, for a materiality assessment of known errors pursuant to SAB 99. The final conclusions on severity of deficiencies frequently rest on this “could factor” portion of the deficiency evaluation; however, too often this part of the evaluation appears to be an afterthought in a company’s analysis.  Yet consideration of the “could factor” is very important. 

The issue is clear; too often companies are finding a control deficiency but not appropriately evaluating the severity of the issue to determine if it is a material weakness.

In a “classic” example this SEC enforcement involves a company that performed its annual ICFR evaluation and stated in its form 10-K that ICFR was effective at year-end. Then, shortly after that report in their Form 10-K, the company restated its financial statements and disclosed the existence of a material weakness. It is very unlikely that the material weakness arose between the year-end of the Form 10-K and the date of the restatement.

You can read about the enforcement in this press release, which also has links to the SEC Enforcement Orders for the company and the individuals involved:

www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-48.html

 

The fact that the company and auditor were named is not surprising. What is surprising is that the firm the company retained to provide SOX 404 services, which included assisting “management with the documentation, testing, and evaluation of the company’s ICFR” and no external report, was included in the enforcement.

This is a loud and clear message to all participants in the process! Be thorough and complete in your evaluation of control deficiencies!

If you would like to delve a bit deeper into this issue one of our follow-up posts to this year’s Form 10-K Tune-Up One Hour Briefing focused on ICFR issues, including the issue raised in this enforcement case.

You can read our post at:

seciblog.pli.edu/?p=530

 

As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome and appreciated!

 

Comment of the Week – Market Risk Reminder

 

We have been discussing the topic of Market Risk Disclosures a lot in this environment of volatile exchange rates, bumpy commodity prices and uncertain interest rates. This disclosure is one of the most confusing parts of Regulation S-K. Without going into a whole lot of details about S-K Item 305 (which we covered in an earlier blog at seciblog.pli.edu/?p=489), as we move towards the end of the first quarter it will continue to be important to focus on getting this disclosure right.

 

So, with this post as a reminder, here is a quick example in a recent comment:

Item7A. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk, page 63

  1. Please provide an analysis on whether your “cash flow hedges,” discussed in the second- to-last paragraph of page 63, are material, such that you would need to provide the disclosure in Item 305(a) of Regulation S-K. Please see General Instruction 5.B to Item 305(a) and (b).

 

As usual, your thoughts and comments are welcome!

Another SEC Accounting Enforcement

 

The most recent fruit of the SEC Enforcement Division’s on-going efforts to find and bring financial reporting cases is against Monsanto Company and several individuals. It was announced on February 9, 2016. You can read the release here:

www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-25.html

 

The case involves some of the classic financial reporting problem areas including revenue recognition, manipulation of expenses and ICFR.

 

The settlement includes fines for both the company and individuals as well as two officers being barred from SEC practice. Interestingly, the settlement also requires the company to hire a compliance consultant to deal with the enforcement related issues.

 

The CEO and CFO, while not named in the case, voluntarily repaid bonuses and share based payment awards that would not have been paid if financial results had not been manipulated. This was essentially a voluntary clawback. As a result, the SEC did not have to bring a case based on the clawback provisions of SOX.

 

As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome!