By: George M. Wilson & Carol A. Stacey<\/p>\n
In a recent speech<\/u><\/a> SEC Chief Accountant Wesley Bricker, towards the end of his remarks, made some interesting overall comments about the evaluation of ICFR. These comments are an interesting step in the ongoing conversation about whether the SOX 404 evaluation of ICFR makes any difference in investor behavior. There has been a lot of anecdotal evidence and much discussion about this question. Mr. Bricker\u2019s comments are not based on supposition, inference or piecemeal observation. His comments have their roots in articles from various academic journals, including the Accounting Review<\/em> and The Journal of Accounting Research<\/em>. Research in these peer-reviewed journals is based on statistical analysis of quantitative data. (If you have never heard of these journals, they are very prestigious academic journals, so if you decide to read any of the articles grab a cup of coffee and a calculator!)<\/p>\n Here are some excerpts from his remarks. The footnote numbers are references to the academic papers which support his points. We left them in so you could follow-up if you would like to review the quantitative research underlying his comments.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Recent experience with disclosures<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Another point related to ICFR is consideration of disclosures.\u00a0 Investors tend to incorporate disclosure of ICFR deficiencies in the price they are willing to pay for a stock. \u00a0For example, companies disclosing material weaknesses are more likely to experience increased cost of capital, and to face more frequent auditor resignations and restatements.<\/a>[11]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Recent academic research suggests:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Companies disclosing internal control deficiencies have credit spreads on loans about 28 basis points higher than that for companies without internal control deficiencies;\u00a0<\/a>[12]<\/u><\/a>\u00a0and<\/p>\n <\/p>\n After disclosing an internal control deficiency for the first time, companies experience a significant increase in cost of equity, averaging about 93 basis points.\u00a0<\/a>[13]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Remediation of ineffective ICFR tends to be followed by improved financial reporting quality, reduced cost of capital, and improved operating performance.<\/a>[14]<\/u><\/a>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0For example,<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Companies that have remediated their prior disclosed internal control deficiencies exhibit an average decrease in market-adjusted cost of equity of 151 basis points;\u00a0<\/a>[15]<\/u><\/a>\u00a0 and<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Remediating companies also experience increases in investment efficiency and in operating performance, suggesting that accounting information generated by effective ICFR is more useful for managerial decision-making.\u00a0<\/a>[16]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n A disclosure of material weaknesses, combined with demonstrating progress toward remediation, can provide investors with information about the company’s ability to function as a public company.\u00a0 Some companies, for example, voluntarily disclose material weaknesses in their registration statements along with their plans for remediating those weaknesses.\u00a0<\/a>[17]<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n You can find citations in to the relevant articles in the text of the speech<\/u><\/a>.<\/p>\n As always, your thoughts and comments are welcome!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By: George M. Wilson & Carol A. Stacey In a recent speech SEC Chief Accountant Wesley Bricker, towards the end of his remarks, made some interesting overall comments about the evaluation of ICFR. These comments are an interesting step in the ongoing conversation about whether the SOX 404 evaluation of ICFR makes any difference in … Continue reading Are There Consequences for Reporting ICFR Problems? \u2013 The Chief Accountant Speaks!<\/span>